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Antitrust Policy, Restricted Distribution,
and the Market for Exclusionary Rights
Herbert Hovenkamp*
In a recent article,' Professors Thomas G. Krattenmaker
and Steven C. Salop attempt to demonstrate that in appropriate
circumstances, certain strategizing firms can obtain monopoly
pricing power by entering into exclusionary arrangements with
their suppliers that raise the costs of the strategizers' rivals.
The authors propose a two-part inquiry and related tests for
identifying exclusionary arrangements that are anticompetitive
because they facilitate monopoly pricing by raising rivals' costs.
This essay analyzes Krattenmaker's and Salop's proposals and
suggests some problems and alternative solutions. It concludes
that although firms may sometimes use vertical restrictions to
raise rivals' costs, Krattenmaker's and Salop's tests are often
inadequate to determine whether such practices are occurring
in a particular case or to measure their effect if they are
occurring.
I.

RAISING RIVALS' COSTS AND THE MARKET
FOR COMPETITION

A. A NEW THEORY, OR A NEW NAME?
A rapidly growing literature discusses strategies by firms
seeking profits called "raising rivals' costs. ' 2 Firms employing
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. This paper was
presented at the antitrust conference of the American Association of Law
Schools, January, 1987.
1. Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion Raising Rivals'
Costs To Achieve Power over Price,96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
2. E.g., CAMPBELL, SPATIAL PREDATION AND COMPETITION IN ANTITRUST
(Stanford Law & Economics Program Working Paper No. 27, 1986); SALOP &
SCHEFFMAN, COsT-RAISING STRATEGIES (Federal Trade Commission Bureau of
Economics, Working Paper No. 146, 1986); Gilbert & Newbery, Preemptive
Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 514 (1982);
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 274-83
(1985); Krattenmaker & Salop, Competition and Cooperation in the Market
for Exclusionary Rights, 76 AMi. ECON. REv. 109 (1986) (papers and proceedings); Lewis, Preemption, Divestiture and Forward Contractingin a Market
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such strategies seek to increase their profits not by reducing
their own costs, which is competitive; nor by excluding rivals
from a market altogether, which is often anticompetitive; nor
by convincing rivals to engage in price fixing, also anticompetitive; but rather by increasing the costs of rivals while imposing
smaller or no price increases on the strategizing firm. Many
hypothesized strategies of raising rivals' costs are anticompetitive; they result in lower total market output and higher con3
sumer prices.
The postulated strategies for raising rivals' costs vary from
quite simple to extremely complex. They also vary in other important ways. Some strategies require concerted behavior by
firms collectively controlling a significant market share. 4
Others require not market dominance but rather success in
convincing a legislative or administrative body to impose costraising regulations.5 Still others can be effected by single, perhaps even nondominant, firms. 6 Some hypothesized strategies
are clearly anticompetitive, because the only plausible explanation for them is that they impose cost increases on rivals. 7
These strategies generally fall into a category of behavior that
the antitrust laws have treated as illegal per se.8 Other strateDominated by a Single Firm, 73 Am. ECON. REV. 1092 (1983); Ordover, Sykes
& Willig, Nonprice Anticompetitive Behavior by Dominant Firms toward the
Producers of Complementary Products, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 115,
115-30 (F. Fisher ed. 1985); Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 Am. ECON.
REV., 335, 335-37 (1979); Salop & Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 Am.
ECON. REv. 267 (1983); Salop, Scheffman & Schwartz, A Bidding Analysis of
Special Interest Legislation: Raising Rivals' Costs in a Rent Seeking Society,
in THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMIssION POLmcAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION:
PRIVATE INTEREsTs IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 103 (1984); Sullivan, On
Nonprice Competition. An Economic and MarketingAnalysis, 45 U. PIr. L.
REV. 771, 776-85 (1984); Williamson, Wage Rates as a Barrier to Entry: The
Pennington Case in Perspective, 82 Q.J. ECON. 85, 90-101 (1968).
3. For some generalizations about when strategies of raising rivals' costs
reduce market output and increase price, see Salop & Scheffman, supra note 2,
at 269.
4. See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 274-80; Williamson, supra note 2, at
108-10.
5. See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 276-77; Maloney & McCormick, A
Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation, 25 J.L. & ECON. 99, 105
(1982); Oster, The Strategic Use of Regulatory Investment by Industry Subgroups, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 604, 606-12 (1982); Salop, Scheffman & Schwartz,
supra note 2, at 104; Williamson, supra note 2, at 106-07.
6. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 251-52.
7. For example, the "naked" agreements between Alcoa and electric utilities not to sell to Alcoa's competitors are clearly anticompetitive. See United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 422 (2d Cir. 1943).
8. That is, because no one has made a plausible argument that the action
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gies may produce efficiency gains while they impose cost increases on rivals. Under traditional antitrust analysis requiring
an assessment of overall impact, these strategies must be
treated under a rule of reason. 9
Strategies for raising rivals' costs are not new, and antitrust tribunals have recognized them for some time. As early
as 1904 in Montague & Co. v. Lowry'0 the defendant association
of tile manufacturers and dealers was accused of requiring
members to sell to nonmembers at the full list price, while
members could sell to other members at any price. 1 As a result the plaintiff nonmember had to pay much more for tile
than did his member competitors.'2 Likewise, in the wellknown Alcoa monopolization case, the government discovered
that Alcoa had negotiated contracts with electric companies
providing that the companies would not supply electricity to
any of Alcoa's competitors.' 3 At least some of these agreements between Alcoa and its competitors appear to have been
"naked"; Alcoa purchased nothing from the utility in question
except a promise that the utility would not sell electricity to
Alcoa's competitors. 14 Other well known antitrust cases inis competitive, and its anticompetitive potential seems fairly obvious, it can be
condemned without 1) definition of a relevant market and assessment of the
defendant's position in that market; or 2) detailed analysis of the effect of the
practice on price or output. See generally 7 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW t
1509-1511 (1986) (discussing per se rules).
9. Because they involve vertical integration, most of the strategies discussed in Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, fall into this category. Because
they involve horizontal integration or joint ventures of competitors, many of
the strategies discussed in Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 274-83, receive rule-of1500-1508 (adreason treatment as well. See also P. AREEDA, supra note 8,
dressing rationale for and application of the rule of reason).
10. 193 U.S. 38 (1904); see also United States v. American Can Co., 230 F.
859 (D. Md. 1916), appeal disnissed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921). In American Can Co.,
the defendant was accused of raising its rivals' costs by entering into exclusive
dealing contracts with suppliers of new, low-cost canning machinery. Under
the contracts the suppliers could sell the new machinery to American Can and
no one else. Id. at 874-75. The scheme apparently failed because as soon as
American Can acquired a large share of the current market it increased its
price so dramatically that it again became profitable to manufacture cans with
older, higher-cost machinery. Id. at 879-80.
11. Montague & Co., 193 U.S. at 41-42.
12. Id. The "cartel ringmaster" theory offered by Krattenmaker & Salop,
supra note 1, at 238-40, differs from the Montague & Co. situation principally
in that the underlying agreement is vertical rather than horizontal. See infra
text accompanying notes 41, 70-73.
13. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 422 (2d Cir.
1945). See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 227.
14. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 44 F. Supp. 97, 121, 144
(S.D.N.Y. 1941), rev'd in part 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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volved strategies of raising rivals' costs, but in these cases the
challenged activities simultaneously reduced the defendants'
costs as well or improved the quality of their products.1 5
The new literature on raising rivals' costs tries to improve
on our former perceptions by providing a more rigorous theory
for predicting when such cost-raising strategies are likely to occur and when they will be anticompetitive. This literature is
generally critical of the antitrust policy of former eras for imagining anticompetitive effects where none existed and where
such effects were frequently implausible.' 6 At the same time,
the literature on raising rivals' costs is "expansionist" in that it
would assign liability in areas where the dominant antitrust
theory today finds little or no danger to competition.1 7 For example, the literature on raising rivals' costs treats practices like
exclusive dealing or other vertical restraints somewhere between the Chicago School notion that all such restraints are
harmless and ought to be legal'- and the notion that prevailed
in the 1960s that all such restraints are suspect and should
either be illegal per se or else be analyzed under very strict
15. See, e.g., United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). In
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, the Court analyzed a joint venture operating a railroad
bridge and cargo transfer system. The venture reduced the members' costs by
permitting them to share facilities subject to very substantial economies of
scale. IM at 386-90. The costs to those not wishing to use the facilities were
prohibitive because alternative shipping facilities were much more expensive
and single-firm use of such facilities would not have permitted achievement of
available scale economies. Similarly, the Supreme Court's concern in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), was with Associated Press's bylaws which prohibited the dissemination of AP news to nonmember
publishers. In both cases, the Supreme Court adopted the efficient solution: it
permitted the efficiency-creating joint ventures to continue, but required the
venturers to open themselves to all competitors on nondiscriminatory terms.
See H. HOVENKAmP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw § 10.3 (1985).
Although it involved single-firm behavior, the more recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585, 610-11 (1985) (requiring that Aspen Skiing cooperate with Highlands on
skiing packages) can be defended on the same grounds.
16. See, e.g., Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 215-22.
17. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1696 (1986).
18. See R. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLIcY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 281-82 (1978) (commenting on the inflexibility of the per se rule regarding vertical price fixing); Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangementsand the Rule of
Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 158-59 (1984) (suggesting that vertical arrangements are often procompetitive and outlining factors to consider in determining whether they should be lawful); Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust
Treatment of Restricted Distributio: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 9
(1981) (suggesting that resale price maintenance should not be treated as per
se illegal by the court).

1987]

ANTITRUST POLICY

1.297

standards. 19
In spite of a substantial literature, many things are not
known about the strategies of raising rivals' costs, including
whether and how often firms employ such strategies, whether
and when the strategies are anticompetitive, and how courts
can identify when the strategies are being employed anticompetitively. Krattenmaker and Salop make the important point
that our theory-making concerning exclusionary behavior has
fallen behind our theory-making concerning cartelization and
its equivalents. 20 In large part this seems to be true because so
much of our recent theory of firm behavior comes from the
Chicago School, whose members indulge in almost unlimited
skepticism about the effectiveness of anticompetitive exclusionary practices.2 1
We know the least about cost-raising exclusionary strategies when they involve vertical restrictions on distribution.
Analysis of vertical integration invariably seems more complex
and controversial than analysis in other areas of antitrust law.
Analysis of the relationship between restricted distribution and
the raising of rivals' costs is no exception.

B.

COMPETrION AS A PUBLIC GOOD

If markets functioned perfectly no vertical arrangements
would be anticompetitive. Such arrangements injure competition only in the presence of high entry barriers, high transaction costs, imperfect information, externalities, or other failures
that prevent markets from performing efficiently. If real world
competition is generally robust-if every attempt to charge monopoly prices is disciplined by new entry or increased output by
competitors-then there is little cause for concern about vertical restraints. As a result, antitrust policy concerning vertical
restraints has been determined in large part by the dominant
perception of how well markets in the real world perform.22
19. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)
(declaring vertical nonprice restraints illegal per se), overruled, Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58, 59 (1977) (illegal per se standard rejected in favor of the rule of reason).
20. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 211 (noting that the "state of
antitrust law governing exclusion" is in "substantial disarray").
21. See Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOME
DAME L. REv. 972, 979-80 (1986) (criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1986), as finding exclusionary conduct that did not exist).
22. In fact, policy concerning most other antitrust violations also has been
determined by perceptions of market performance. For a brief historical over-
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The Warren Court's lack of hospitality toward vertical restrictions was based on an economic theory that emphasized imperfections in real world markets. 23 The theory particularly
emphasized the perceived ability of manufacturers of differentiated products to "manipulate" the demand for their products by
controlling the distribution system.24 Conversely, the Chicago
School's extreme position that nearly all vertical restraints
should be legal is based on a judgment that market imperfections have been greatly exaggerated, 25 or else that competition
is powerful enough to overcome them.26 In return, new theories under which vertical restrictions can be anticompetitive are
based on new perceptions that markets do not perform as effec27
tively as Chicago School economists presume.
The Chicago School competitive model is predicated on the
assumption that the welfare of society will be maximized when
the amount of competition is maximized. Although this may be
true, it does not necessarily follow that the unregulated market
will maximize competition. One of the most important contributions of the academic literature on raising rivals' costs is the
observation that competition itself is a "public good"2 8 -that is,
a good that benefits society as a whole that cannot be fully accounted for by market processes. If a good is truly public, it is
practically impossible to organize a market transaction in that
view of the dominant economic theories guiding antitrust policy, see
Hovenkamp, sulpra note 2, at 213-26.
23. The leading case is United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365, 382 (1967), declaring vertical nonprice restraints illegal per se.
24. See Comanor, Vertical Territorialand Customer Restrictions: White
Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1419, 1419-22 (1968).
25. For example, the belief that market imperfections have been exaggerated is the thrust of the Chicago School's relentless--and for the most part
well-founded--criticism of the "monopoly leverage" theory of vertical integration. As Louis Kaplow notes, however, the Chicago School critique of the theory assumes away many imperfections that might permit anticompetitive

leverage to be used. See Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 515, 520-39 (1985).
26. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 18, at 280-309; Easterbrook, supra note
18, at 159-61. But see Hovenkamp, Rhetoric and Skepticism in AntitrustArgument 84 MICH. L. REv. 1721 (1986).
27. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 25, at 536-39; Scherer, The Economics of

Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTrTRUST L.J. 687, 690-704 (1983) (analyzing competitive effects of vertical restraints in imperfectly competitive markets). For an
argument that the influence of Chicago School economics on judicial antitrust
decision making in the late 1970s and 1980s has been greatly exaggerated, see
Kaplow, Antitrus Law & Economics, and the Courts, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. (1987) (forthcoming).
28. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 110.
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good so that all those who benefit from the transaction can be
forced to pay their share, or all those injured can be compensated, or both.29 To illustrate, one can easily demonstrate that
suppliers are best off if the retailers to whom they sell charge
competitive prices. In fact, as a general rule firms are best off
when vertically related firms behave competitively.3 0 A supplier therefore may be willing to pay for a guarantee from a retailer that it will charge only competitive prices. To view the
relationship from the other side, however, a supplier might be
willing for a certain payment to permit one or more of its retailers to charge monopoly prices. For example, a supplier
might be tempted for a sum to join or acquiesce in a cartel of its
retailers in exchange for some of the cartel's monopoly profits.3 ' By such participation the supplier effectively "sells" to
the retailer's cartel whatever benefits he might otherwise obtain from competition in the retail market.
In the real world competition produces net wealth. As a
result, if all those benefitted or injured by competition were
able to participate in the bargaining process in this illustration,
the resulting market would be competitive.3 2 Not all the beneficiaries of competition participated in the transaction described
above, however. Although the supplier benefits from competition in the retailers' market, dozens of others-principally consumers-benefit as well. Far from inviting consumers to
participate in this bargaining process, the supplier and retailers
intentionally kept it secret from them. Importantly, although
retailer competition is valuable to the supplier, it is not as valuable to the supplier alone as it is to the supplier plus the retailers' customers. As Krattenmaker and Salop note, several
people have suggested that markets could perform quite competitively if all those affected by competition were invited into
29. For an excellent, brief, and not too technical discussion of the economics of public goods, see E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 489-518 (1985).
30. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, § 9.2, at 249.
31. This is not likely to happen unless market failures are so substantial
that the value to the dealer from participating in the cartel is large enough to
compensate the supplier for all its losses, with a surplus remaining. It is most
likely to occur if the wealth transfer that results from price fixing is large in
proportion to the deadweight loss-most generally, when the consumers' price
elasticity of demand is very low. See generally Hovenkamp, Vertical Restrictions and Monopoly Power, 64 B.U.L. REv. 521, 529-34 (1984) (discussing vertical restrictions and supplier participation in retailer cartels).
32. That is, because the gainers from competition stand to gain more than
the losers stand to lose, the potential gainers would outbid the potential losers
and purchase the competitively structured market.
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the bidding process; 33 nevertheless, we have not figured out any

practicable way to do this, particularly in those situations
where the purchase and sale of competition is kept a secret
from an important class of affected market participants.
That competition is a public good makes an anticompetitive
exclusionary rights theory plausible. If competition is bought
and sold in a market that denies access to interested bidders,
the sale of exclusionary rights will not necessarily be welfare
maximizing and may be anticompetitive.3 That a market for
anticompetitive exclusionary rights thus exists does not tell us,
however, whether vertical contracts as a class or even any specific vertical arrangements are anticompetitive. It may tell us
only that firms can use exclusionary rights to eliminate competition among themselves, or that competitors acting in concert
can impose higher costs on new entrants or other rivals.

35

An

"exclusionary rights" theory that explained only that certain

33. For example, if a supplier were offered a sum by a dealers' cartel to
participate in it, perhaps by "imposing" resale price maintenance on the dealers or providing legally enforceable vertical restraints to enforce their horizontal territorial division scheme, the supplier might ask the dealers' customers to
bid against the cartel for the preservation of competition. In a perfectly-functioning market the customers would be willing to bid enough to win, because
the amount by which the supplier plus the customers value competition will
be greater, by the amount of deadweight loss created by the cartel, than the
amount by which the dealers value the monopoly profits from cartelization.
See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, § 2.3, at 49 ("[T]he consumer welfare principle is predicated on the observation that everyone is a consumer.").
Nevertheless, there are two important, and quite different, objections to
using this argument to justify abandoning the antitrust concern with price fixing: 1) an empirical, economic judgment that, even disregarding the antitrust
enforcement consequences, in the real world this bidding process would not
occur because the consumers could not be identified and organized so as to
bring it about; and 2) a political, or distributive, judgment that people are entitled to a competitive market without having to "pay" for it.
In fact, in this case (2) collapses into (1). Even if consumers bid more for
competition than the cartelizing dealers would bid for supplier participation in
the cartel, the final outcome-at least as far as consumers are concernedwould be the same. Their bid for a competitive market would effectively raise
their price of the product, and demand would be reduced to below the competitive level; as a result, the suppliers (rather than the dealer) would earn monopoly returns in the form of the bid payments themselves.
34. Consumer preferences other than competition might also be public
goods-for example, the preference for a regime of small businesses. Because
each consumer believes her own purchase choice has an insignificant impact
on the structure of the economy, she purchases where the price is lowest in
spite of a preference for a world of higher-priced smaller firms. See
Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 243-44.
35. See Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 44-47 (1904), discussed
supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
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horizontal restraints are harmful would be neither very revolutionary nor very helpful. All but the most radical right in antitrust policy think that some agreements among competitors are
bad and should be condemned.
II. THE MARKET FOR COMPETITION AND THE
EXCLUSIONARY RIGHTS DOCTRINE
A. IDENTIFYING A MARKET FOR EXCLUSIONARY RIGHTs
The insight that competition itself can be bought and sold
in a market that performs poorly is helpful if it explains transactions that were previously considered obscure or controversial. In Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs To
Achieve Power over Price,36 Krattenmaker and Salop attempt
to do exactly that. They look at various kinds of vertical restrictions as the product of a market for "exclusionary
rights"-that is, as contracts in which one or both of the parties
promises to refrain from entering some segment of the market
that they might otherwise enter. For example, an exclusive
dealing contract is a sale by one of the parties of the right to
shop elsewhere for part of his requirements, as is a tying arrangement. A vertical territorial or customer arrangement is a
sale by one of the parties of the right to sell in a certain region
or to a certain class of customers. In short, a sale of an exclusionary right is the sale of the right to compete in a way that
the seller might wish absent the arrangement. Because competition is a public good, the sale of such a right can be anticompetitive; it can impose larger losses than gains on all those
affected by the transaction.
Krattenmaker and Salop suggest that the sale of exclusion-

37
ary rights can be anticompetitive when a well-placed firm im-

poses higher costs on rivals than the strategizing firm faces
itself. This analysis is consistent with the consumer welfare
principle; Krattermaker and Salop believe that preservation of
competition, economically defined, should be the goal of the an36.

Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 223-27.

37. A "well-placed" firm could be the dominant firm in the market, but it
could also be a group of established firms explicitly or tacitly colluding. Ordinarily it could not be a nondominant firm acting alone, because the strategies
generally require arrangements that cover a large percentage of a relevant
market, unless they are achieved by governmental intervention into the market. Governmental intervention might occur, for example, if one taxicab firm
convinced the sovereign to give it a monopoly of a certain class of business.
See Campbell v. City of Chicago, 639 F. Supp. 1501, 1502, 1503-05 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (suit by cab drivers over city ordinances regulating taxicab licenses).
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titrust laws.38
Krattenmaker and Salop argue that vertical restraints
might be anticompetitive in this way under a number of theories. For example, a dominant firm might: 1) use exclusive
dealing or similar arrangements to tie up competitors' access to
low-cost inputs, leaving the competitors with only higher-cost
inputs;3 9 2) use exclusive dealing or similar arrangements to tie
up so much of an input that competitors bid up the price for the
input that remains; 40 3) obtain agreements from a large number
of suppliers that they will impose resale price maintenance or
other price-raising distribution restrictions on competitors; 41 or
4) use exclusive dealing or similar arrangements to alter the
structure of the market remaining available to competitors in
such a way as to facilitate collusion there. 42
Krattenmaker and Salop accept what has become the dominant view today that vertical restrictions are generally competitive and beneficial to society.4 3 Consistent with their analysis,
vertical restrictions imposed by a single nondominant firm in a
competitively structured market would appear to be harmless. 44
As a general rule, only restrictions that foreclose a large share
of a market will permit the two inferences necessary for concluding that a vertical restriction is anticompetitive-namely,
that 1) the restrictions do indeed raise the costs of rivals; and 2)
as a result, the strategizing firm is able to raise its own prices
and earn monopoly returns. Thus, determination of market
structure and of the strategizing firm's relative position in the
45
market become essential.
38. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 213, 215.
39. Id. at 234-35. Krattenmaker and Salop characterize this as the "bottleneck" theory. Id. at 234.
40. Id. at 236-38. Krattenmaker and Salop describe this as the "real foreclosure" strategy. Id. at 236.
41. Id,at 238-40. Krattenmaker and Salop dub this the "cartel ringmaster" strategy. Id at 238.
42. Id. at 240-42. Krattenmaker and Salop call this the "Frankenstein
monster" strategy. Id. at 240-41.
43. Id at 228-29.
44. Such vertical restrictions would be harmless unless a nondominant
firm should somehow succeed in tying up a source of supply that gave it a significant cost advantage over all other firms. This might happen, for example,
if a nondominant firm was the successful bidder for a government monopoly
franchise that gave the franchisee distinct advantages over all competitors. See
Campbell v. City of Chicago, 639 F. Supp. 1501, 1504 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (Yellow
and Checker cab companies reached an agreement with the City of Chicago

giving the two companies a perpetual right to 80% of the taxicab licenses).
45. This position has been argued many times before. See H. HOVENKAMP,

supra note 15, § 9.2; see also U.S. Dep't of Justice, Vertical Distributions Re-
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Krattenmaker and Salop argue that a tribunal assessing
whether a particular vertical restraint is anticompetitive must
make the following determinations:
First, one should ask whether the conduct of the challenged firm unavoidably and significantly increases the costs of its competitors. If so,
one then should ask whether raising rivals' costs enables the excluding firm to exercise monopoly
power-that is, to raise its price above
46
the competitive level.

B. AMBIGUITY AND CONFLICT IN THE USE OF SURROGATES
It is well known that the behavior antitrust policy is most
concerned about-persistent sales at a price higher than marginal cost-cannot generally be measured directly, certainly not
in a courtroom. 4 7 Antitrust analysis addresses this problem by
using a variety of substitutes and simplifying assumptions to estimate a firm's ability to charge prices higher than marginal
cost, or to evaluate a charge that some practice increases a
firm's ability to charge such a price.4 8
Krattenmaker and Salop propose some tests for identifying
practices that facilitate monopoly pricing by raising rivals' costs.
They suggest that these tests measure whether a rival's costs
are "unavoidably and significantly" increased as a result of such
practices, and whether this in turn permits the strategizing
firm to charge monopoly prices. 49 The tests that Krattenmaker
and Salop propose, however, are in most instances proxies for
the true object of their measurement.5 0 The tests generally
measure, using objective criteria, whether the market structure
suggests that the rivals' costs are increased. 51 Frequently, Kratstraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6263 (1985) (explaining the Justice Department's enforcement policy) [hereinafter, VRGs].
46. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 214.
47. See Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L.
REV. 937, 939-41 (1981). Courts cannot measure this behavior because they
cannot compute marginal cost, and most practical measures of market power,
such as the Lerner Index, require knowledge of marginal cost. Id at 941.
48. The ability to charge prices higher than marginal cost can be inferred,
under appropriate circumstances, from high market share, persistent supranormal profits, or the ability to price discriminate. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra
note 15, §§ 3.1-.7.
49. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 214.
50. Krattenmaker and Salop note an exception. Under their "bottleneck"
theory there might be direct evidence that rivals' costs have been raised-such
as empirical evidence that all input sources not controlled by the supplier are
more expensive than those that are. See id at 258-59.
51. See id at 253 ("objective measures for estimating the likelihood and
magnitude of anticompetitive effects").
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tenmaker and Salop condemn practices on the basis of market
structure tests analogous to those used in the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines 52 or its Vertical Restraints
53
Guidelines.
A proposed test for antitrust liability should not be faulted
because it fails to measure directly the improper exercise or increase of market power. Such a criticism would apply to nearly
every test the courts currently use. In this case, however, the
proposed tests are subject to two objections, one quite specific
but which does not apply to all of Krattenmaker's and Salop's
postulated strategies, the other broader but more difficult to
state. The first objection is that anticompetitive results under
Krattenmaker's and Salop's cost-increasing strategies cannot always be attributed to a particular vertical arrangement on the
basis of proxy evidence alone. In that case, the arrangements
should not be condemned under these theories on the basis of
such proxy evidence, because the efficiency-creating potential
of vertical restrictions is present in all markets, concentrated as
well as unconcentrated.
The second objection is that Krattenmaker's and Salop's
proposed tests require the use of competing proxies in evaluating vertical restraints.M Under well-developed economic theories vertical restraints can increase a firm's efficiency by
lowering its distribution costs or reducing the risk of entry into
a market.55 These cost decreases, however, cannot be measured
and frequently cannot be identified in a particular case. Nevertheless, such cost decreases are reasonably presumed to explain
most vertical restrictions. Under the theories proposed by
Krattenmaker and Salop the same restrictions might raise the
costs of rivals. Once again, however, in most cases the existence or degree of these cost increases cannot be determined in
a particular case. Importantly, in most of the cases that Krattenmaker and Salop describe, a vertical restraint could simultaneously lower the costs of the firm imposing the restraint while
52. 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984). For a critique of the VRGs' analysis of
market structure, see P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW I 518.2526.1 (Supp. 1986).
53. See supra note 45.
54. The government's VRGs, supra note 45, are subject to the same criticism, particularly if--as is widely believed-vertical restrictions are not used
very often to facilitate horizontal collusion. The theory of the VRGs is not
that vertical restraints might raise rivals' costs, but rather that they may facilitate tacit or express collusion in one of the markets covered by the restraint.
55. For a summary of the theories, see H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 15,
§§ 9.2, 9.4.
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it increases the costs of rivals. In such cases any assessment of
the competitive consequences of the restraint requires some
kind of balancing of the two effects against each other.56 When
neither effect can be measured directly, this balancing problem
is intractable.5 7
1.

Proxy Evidence of Cost-increasing Vertical Strategies

A vertical restriction's impact on rivals' costs might be estimated in at least three different ways. First, the impact might
be estimated directly, by proof taken from a rival's cost figures
or some equivalent source.58 Alternatively, the impact might
be estimated indirectly, for example, by evidence that the market shares of rivals decreased while the share of the strategizing firm increased. Finally, the impact might be estimated by
examining changes in market structure that result from the
challenged practice and that suggest that rivals' costs have
increased.
At a minimum, the selected measuring tool will be useful
only if it can distinguish cost increases to the rival from cost decreases to the strategizing firm. Although condemnation of
practices that raise rivals' costs is an eminently worthwhile
goal, condemnation of practices that simply lower the
strategizer's costs is not, even if the effect is to make rivals
worse off. Thus, evidence that the strategizer's market share
increased while that of its rivals decreased is generally useless
because it is absolutely consistent with both an increase in rivals' costs and a decrease in the strategizer's costs.59 Likewise,
evidence that the strategizer's profits or margins increased
56. In most cases, the relevant question is whether total market output increased or decreased as a result of the restraint. This would be a function of:
1) the amount by which the restraint reduced the strategizing firm's costs; 2)
the amount by which the restraint increased the costs of rivals; and 3) the
strategizing firm's market share. As Krattenmaker and Salop are well aware,
output tests will not work in antitrust litigation because the relevant "output"
is too difficult to define and, in any event, incapable of measurement in real
world markets. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 283-84;

Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 256-60.

As noted infra text accompanying notes 78-80, although the anticompetitive threat posed by vertical restraints increases as a firm's market share rises,
so too does the efficiency-creating potential of the restraint.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 76-87.
58. Such direct proof might be supplied, for example, by the price figures
of those supplying inputs.
59. This is the fallacy commonly committed by Chicago School scholars
who suggest "output" tests for measuring the competitive impact of vertical restraints. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 163-64 (proposing an output
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while those of its rivals decreased is equally consistent with
both increases in rivals' costs and decreases in the strategizer's
costs.
Krattenmaker and Salop generally rely on information
about market structure to estimate a vertical restriction's impact on rivals' costs. Because of the state of our knowledge
about markets, however, facts about market structure are at
best circumstantial evidence of impact on rivals' costs, and may
be far less. On the one hand, Krattenmaker and Salop suggest
that their tests measure "whether the [challenged] conduct...
unavoidably and significantly increases the costs of... competitors.

' 60

On the other hand, they describe their procedures for

making this measurement as developing "objective measures
for estimating the likelihood and magnitude of anticompetitive
effects." 61 Clearly, however, measuring likely effects is not the
same as discovering that a practice "unavoidably and significantly" increases costs. Evidence drawn from market structure
generally tells us only that such cost increases are plausible.
I use the word "plausible" here rather than the word
"likely" because indirect evidence drawn from data about market structure is much better at telling us whether certain kinds
of conduct (such as collusion) are possible than at predicting
that they will actually occur. Often the statement that conditions, objectively measured, are conducive to the occurrence of
some event tells us little about whether the event will actually
occur. 62 More accurately, it tells us that conditions inconsistent

with its occurrence are not present. Thus, we can be more certain that collusion will not occur in an unconcentrated market
with negligible entry barriers than that it will occur in a concentrated market with high entry barriers.
Knowing that a market is conducive to cartelization or secret purchases of exclusionary rights or even strategic manipulation of supply of inputs is not the same as knowing that these
practices will really occur or measuring what their magnitude
test); Posner, supra note 18, at 21-22 (restating his output test to focus on mar-

ket share).
60. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 214.
61. Id. at 253.
62. For example, the statement that certain weather conditions are conducive to tornadoes may not tell us that a tornado is highly likely or even that
there is a better than 50% chance that a tornado will occur. It tells us only
that, based on the measurement capabilities we have, tornadoes have frequently occurred under similar conditions and have seldom or never occurred
under other conditions. That is, certain weather conditions are a prerequisite
to the occurrence of tornadoes.
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will be. With respect to some of Krattenmaker's and Salop's
proposed strategies, actual measurement of increases in rivals'
costs seems to be absolutely essential, because no amount of
market structure data is likely to tell us whether the hypothesized cost increases are "likely."
For example, the strategy for raising rivals' costs that Krattenmaker and Salop call the "Frankenstein monster" theory63
will not likely succeed no matter what the market structure,
because the situation that it creates is extremely unstable. The
"Frankenstein monster" theory posits that a supplier enters
into exclusive dealing contracts with many dealers, thus causing the market for dealing services available to rival suppliers
to become much more concentrated. 64 These remaining dealers
are much more likely to engage in tacit or express collusion.
The tests proposed by Krattenmaker and Salop for evaluating
and eventually condemning this behavior do not require proof
that such collusion is actually occurring, but only that the new
"market" structure facilitates it. Importantly, the rivals' costs
will not be raised at all unless the collusion actually occurs.
In this case, however, there is one important impediment
to the occurrence of such collusion. If the independent dealers
collude it will be more profitable for a dealer to be independent
than to be committed to an exclusive dealing agreement with
the strategizing firm, because the collusion gives the independent dealers higher profits than the committed dealers are earning. In fact, the strategy is profitable only if the independent
dealers exact a higher markup than do the committed dealers.
We would therefore expect a mad rush of dealers to evade the
exclusive dealing contracts. 65 Conceivably, the arrangement
63. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 240-42; see also supra text accompanying note 42.
64. As a matter of convention, the word "supplier" here refers to an upstream participant in a transaction while the word "dealer" refers to a downstream participant.
65. For example, suppose that a market contains 100 dealers and that
other preconditions for cartelization are present, so that if five dealers were
left free in the market they could successfully raise prices from a competitive
dealer markup of 10 cents to a markup of 13 cents. As the theory goes, a dominant supplier engages 95 of the dealers in exclusive-dealing contracts, thus denying them to competing suppliers; as a result, the remaining five dealers will
cartelize the market and raise the markup to 13 cents. Thus the dominant
supplier's rivals will face distribution costs of 13 cents while the dominant firm
has distribution costs of only 10 cents.
This strategy successfully raises rivals' costs only as long as the cartelizing
dealers-those not involved in exclusive dealing with the dominant firmcharge a higher markup than the dealers subject to the dominant firm's exclu-
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might be made more stable, perhaps by long term exclusive
dealing contracts coupled with rigorous enforcement by the
supplier;66 the strategizing firm nevertheless will find it difficult to maintain its hold over all these retailers if it is more
67
profitable to be independent.
Even if the strategizing firm entered into exclusive dealing
contracts with ninety-nine precent of the dealers in a market
with high entry barriers and obviously conducive to collusion,
the strategizer would still not be able reliably to earn monopoly
profits by collusion among the remaining one precent of the
dealers because as soon as the independent dealers' profits
went up, the strategizer's dealers would begin defecting. In
that case no amount of data drawn from market structure
could tell us that increases in a rival's costs are likely to result
from the "Frankenstein monster" strategy.68 As a result, it
would never be efficient to condemn exclusive dealing under
this theory. This is doubly true in light of the widely-known ef69
ficiency of exclusive dealing.
sive dealing arrangement. In that case, however, it is more lucrative for a
dealer to cease the exclusive dealing arrangement and become "independent"
so that it too can obtain a markup of 13 rather than 10 cents. As a result, the
dominant firm is likely to face a highly unstable situation in which all of its
dealers attempt to jump ship or, more likely, never agree to exclusive dealing
in the first place.
66. In this case, "enforcement" of the exclusive dealing arrangement does
not mean termination of the dealer-which is precisely what the dealer
wants-but rather an action for damages or an injunction ordering the dealer
to honor its contract and purchase exclusively from the dominant firm, or perhaps threats not to sell to the dealer at all unless he acquiesces in exclusive
dealing. Such actions seem to be calculated to invite defenses and counterclaims under the antitrust laws, and will guarantee the dominant firm a lifetime of antitrust litigation. In any event, the ordinary remedy for breach of an
exclusive dealing contract is damages, not an injunction. Damages based on
the contract-market price differential would likely be negligible.
67. Another alternative would be for the strategizing firm to acquire the
95 stations, thus denying them the opportunity to jump ship. That would give
the vertically integrated dominant supplier a cost advantage over any smaller
suppliers forced to deal with a cartel of the remaining dealers. Given that the
dominant firm is capable of acquiring 95 stations, however, there is no obvious
reason why the competitors could not also acquire their own stations, and thus
avoid the consequences of the cartel. In any event the strategies proposed in
the article under discussion deal only with contractual arrangements, not with
mergers.
68. Even if it were established in court that the remaining dealers in the
above example were actually engaged in price fixing, and that this price fixing
was possible only because the dominant supplier foreclosed so much of the
market that its concentration was increased, the proper remedy would be to
condemn not the exclusive dealing but rather the price fixing itself.
69. See H. HovENKAMP, supra note 15, § 8.12, at 243-45. Compare Marvel,
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Krattenmaker's and Salop's "cartel ringmaster" theory"
likewise leaves some unanswered questions. The situation
Krattennaker and Salop posit could raise rivals' costs should it
ever arise: if a firm could convince its suppliers to charge
higher prices to the firm's rivals or discriminate against them
in some other way, the firm could itself charge higher prices.
Krattenmaker and Salop even suggest that this may explain
71
what happened in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States
without the need to infer an agreement among the defendant
distributors.7 2 Critical questions remain unanswered, however:
why will the scheme work, absent an agreement among the
suppliers, 73 and why would it be stable if it were initiated? A
unilateral price increase by a supplier would have yielded only
lost sales and profits; the price increase, whether initiated by a
powerful buyer or not, works only if the other suppliers do it as
well.
2.

Efficiencies and Competitive Harm: Balancing by Proxy

That vertical restrictions can enable manufacturers to reduce their costs of distribution is relatively uncontroversial. As
a result most vertical restraints are analyzed under a rule of
Exclusive Dealing,25 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1982) (stating that "[t]he most commonly expressed view of exclusive dealing in the literature portrays it as a device to obtain increased dealer promotional effort").
70. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 238-40; see also supratext accompanying note 41.
71. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
72. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 238-39. Professor Phillip
Areeda also believes an antitrust violation could be found in Interstate Circuit
Inc. without inferring an agreement among the distributors. The violation,
however, was the unreasonable vertical arrangements themselves. In that
case, of course, that the arrangements were solicited by a dominant exhibitor
as a device to raise rivals' costs would be irrelevant. It would appear that the
exhibitor itself did not even violate the antitrust laws, but merely requested
others to do so. See 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 8, %1426, at 158 (1986).
73. One could postulate that the agreement was tacit, but nevertheless
each firm would agree to depart from a competitive strategy only if it had
some faith that other firms would behave in the same manner. Of course, one
might take the approach that the restriction should be condemned as a device
for facilitating tacit collusion, particularly given that the Sherman Act does
not reach tacit collusion directly. In that case, however, the added wrinkle
that the device is being used by one firm vertically related to the colluders to
raise rivals' costs becomes superfluous. Under relatively orthodox theory, vertical restraints can be condemned when they facilitate tacit or express collusion. For example, this is the principal theory of the VRGs, supra note 45, at
6268 (recommending that vertical restraints unlikely to cause collusion not be
challenged).
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reason, 74 and most of the restraints analyzed in this way are up-

held.7 5 Quantifying the magnitude of such efficiencies in gen-

eral, or even determining whether they actually obtain in a
particular case, however, is generally beyond the courts' capacity. Courts, therefore, seldom consider how a particular restraint might reduce the defendant's costs or increase the
quality of its product. Rather, the theory that vertical restraints are generally efficient is part of the "background" information that induces courts to be hospitable toward the
restraints. The theory thus forces the plaintiff to provide a
good explanation why the restraint in a particular case is
anticompetitive.
If a vertical restraint can simultaneously reduce the costs
of the strategizing firm and increase the costs of rivals, determining the "net" efficiency of the restraint may require the
court to quantify these two phenomena and balance them in
some way. As noted above, a court will rarely be able to conclude that a restraint has in fact raised rivals' costs, and it will
almost never be able to quantify such a cost increase were it to
find one, unless there is direct evidence. 76 Likewise, a court
would seldom or never be able to quantify the efficiency gains
that result from a particular practice.
Under Krattenmaker's and Salop's theory, 77 as under the
theory of the Justice Department's Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 78 vertical restraints are most likely to be anticompetitive
when markets are concentrated and the firm or firms imposing
the restraints have a large market share. 79 This theory repre74. The outstanding exception is resale price maintenance, which is illegal
per se. See H. HOVENKAmP, supra note 15, § 9.1, at 247.

75. For example, it is now commonplace that the effect of adopting ruleof-reason analysis of vertical nonprice restraints has been judicial approval of
the vast majority of them. See Kaplow, Antitrus Law & Economics, and the
Courts,supra note 27.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
77. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 275. "iTihe larger the
purchaser's market share, the greater its reward for achieving power over
price, hence the greater its willingness to pay to achieve anticompetitive exclusion." Id.
78. See VRGs, supra note 45, at 6267. Anticompetitive effects are very unlikely when "the firms using the restraints have small market shares, .. . the
restraints are not widely used, or... the restraints are used in markets too
unconcentrated for the exercise of market power." Id
79. Many courts also have adopted this reasoning and assess a marketpower requirement in vertical restraints cases. See, e.g., Assam Drug Co. v.
Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311, 316-17 (8th Cir. 1986) (adopting a "market
power approach" in a case applying state antitrust law similar to federal law);
Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 702 (7th Cir.)
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sents significant progress from earlier analysis, which often saw
little connection between market power and the legality of vertical restraints. Importantly, however, the larger the strategizing firm's market share, the larger the impact of any efficiencycreating restraint on total market output.8 0 For example, if a
firm with a ninety percent market share reduces its costs the
impact on the market will be much greater than if a firm with
a ten percent market share reduces its costs. Thus, although
the potential danger from anticompetitive vertical restraints increases as the market share of the strategizing firm increases,
so also does the potential for efficiency gains. As a result we
cannot say that a particular restraint is likely to be anticompetitive on balance simply because the firm imposing the restraint
has a large market share.
Krattenmaker and Salop acknowledge that a complex rule
for analyzing vertical restrictions is necessary because the restrictions at least plausibly create efficiencies at the same time
that they may raise rivals' costs.8 ' Nevertheless, they tentatively propose that most claims of substantial efficiencies be ignored if the evidence also indicates that the practice confers
substantial power over price upon the defendant.8 2 In reaching
this conclusion Krattenmaker and Salop distinguish between
hard, empirical evidence that a particular practice actually produces efficiencies, and evidence that establishes "only the logical possibility that such efficiencies will be realized. 8 3 They
would require those relying on efficiencies as a defense to "develop standards for estimating the magnitude of those
8 s4
efficiencies.
Krattenmaker and Salop nevertheless are willing to permit
purely theoretical evidence, drawn from the structure of the
market, that a practice raises rivals' costs. They are willing to
condemn a practice on the basis of indirect, generally conjec(stating that "plaintiff must show that the defendant has market power"), cert
denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d
1560, 1568-69 (11th Cir. 1983) (requiring proof of market power).
80. Likewise, the larger the market share held by a group of firms imposing the restraint, whether unilaterally or in concert, the larger the impact of
the restraint.
81. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 228-29, 277-78.

82. Id- at 280.
83. Id. Krattenmaker and Salop offer no evidence tending to undermine
the substantial literature arguing that most vertical restraints are efficient and
that antitrust tribunals therefore should be hospitable toward them. On the
contrary, they concede the point. Id at 219-23.
84. Id. at 281.
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tural evidence of its harmful potential, while they ignore
equally convincing theoretical evidence that the practice is efficiency producing. Such a position is defensible only if a vertical
restraint is less likely to be efficient on balance than anticompetitive.8 5 As noted earlier, the observation that market conditions are "conducive" to a certain practice tells us very little
86
If
about the likelihood that the practice will actually occur.
on the basis of purely theoretical evidence we conclude that a
certain practice is "conducive" to the raising of rivals' costs but
that it may also produce substantial efficiencies, we still know
very little about whether neither or both of these things will
87
occur, or about what their magnitude will be if they do occur.
Consider Krattenmaker's and Salop's illustration s drawn
from the facts of Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.8 9
Klor's alleged that defendant Broadway-Hale (BH) purchased
promises from one or more manufacturers that they would not
deal with Klor's.90 Krattennaker and Salop note that Klor's
would have to show, "as a threshold matter," that the arrangement raised its costs, which requires a showing that one of
Klor's inputs is now more expensive and that this higher ex85. More accurately, this position is defensible only if anticipated productive efficiency gains to the strategizing firm are less than anticipated losses in
allocative and productive efficiency caused by the restraint's tendency to raise
rivals' costs. These anticipated losses include losses both in allocative efficiency, in that they facilitate monopoly pricing, and in productive efficiency, in
that they raise the production or distribution costs of rivals.
86. See supra text accompanying note 62.
87. Krattenmaker and Salop address but do not resolve the dilemma of
which efficiency claims are relevant-all efficiencies, or only those that yield
lower consumer prices in the short run. They conclude: 1) the antitrust laws
at least arguably say something about how wealth should be distributed between consumers and sellers, as well as about efficiencies; and 2) historically,
efficiency claims have been ignored, and thus the burden is on those arguing
for the defendants to show why the claims should be considered, unless they
are very strong. See id. at 278-82.
88. See id. at 268-69, 289-91.
89. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
90. Id at 209. The illustration fits Krattenmaker's and Salop's description
of an exclusionary rights strategy that is more likely to be successful because
it raises the rival's variable, and thus its marginal, costs much more than it
raises the rival's fixed costs. The item in which cost is raised is inventory for
resale, which is a variable cost. Krattenmaker and Salop posit that strategies
that raise rivals' fixed costs by relatively more and marginal costs by relatively
less will be less successful because 1) they will have a smaller effect on rivals'
prices, which are computed on the basis of marginal cost, and 2) their impact
on rivals' profits is nevertheless sufficiently substantial that rivals will be inclined to take countermeasures. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 266,
271.
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pense contributed significantly to Klor's cost of doing business. 91 Klor's can establish this by showing that all remaining
appliance manufacturers were less efficient, had very limited
capacity, or were so concentrated that they would collude-in
92
short, that one of the four theories of raising rivals' costs
could apply. In any of these cases Klor's would have to pay
more for inventory than it had paid previously. Krattenmaker
and Salop observe 93 that one could infer this by examining concentration in the supply market before and after the agreement, using a concentration measure such as the HerfindahlHirschman Index,94 combined with the conclusions about permissible concentration levels contained in the 1984 Justice Department Merger Guidelines. 95
Klor's would next have to show that the exclusionary
rights agreement permits BH to raise prices profitably.96 This
would additionally require an analysis of the retail market in
which BH and Klor's sell. Klor's could prevail, for example, by
showing that BH is the only firm in that market that is unaffected by the vertical restraint, or perhaps by a showing that
BH is a dominant firm, or else that other firms operating in the
market that are unaffected by the restraint are likely to collude
with BH.9 7 Krattenmaker and Salop suggest that such inferences could be drawn by the objective method of examining the
structure of the "unaffected" market-that is, the market consisting of those firms whose costs are not raised by the vertical
restraint. If the "unaffected" market data support the requisite
inference, Klor's thus would have succeeded in showing that
the restraint was anticompetitive.9 8
At this point it is important to consider two additional factors: counterstrategies that might be available to Klor's 9s and
the cost to BH of purchasing the exclusionary rights. As Krattenmaker and Salop note, Klor's could bid against BH and
might be willing to pay more than BH for the exclusionary
right at issue. 1°0 Krattenmaker and Salop respond that this
91. Id at 289.
92.
93.

94.
95.

See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 290.
See P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAmp, supra note 52,
Supra note 52.

913.1.

96. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 290.

97. Id98. See i&
99. See i& at 269.
100. Id That is, Kor's might offer the appliance manufacturers more to
continue selling to Kior's than BH would offer them to stop selling to Kior's.
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possibility is not relevant because the "admission fees" themselves raise the rivals' costs by the amount of their bids.' 01 The
other side of that coin, however, is that if BH purchases the exclusionary right it will raise its own costs as well as those of rival Klor's.
For example, suppose the appliance market has two suppliers, A with costs of $100 and B with costs of $105. BH would
like to purchase an exclusionary right from A in the form of a
contract that A will not sell to Klor's. As a result Klor's must
purchase from B, and its costs will increase by $5. BH's costs,
however, will also increase by the price of the exclusionary
rights contract. BH's strategy, we presume, will be effective if
the price of the exclusionary right amounts to less than $5 per
unit sold by BH. If the strategy is to be successful the price to
A will have to be substantially greater than A's foregone profits
from sales to Klor's.

02

It will have to be substantially greater,

rather than merely equal, to A's foregone profits, because if the
strategy is successful A will lose on two fronts: 1) the profits
that A would have earned from its sales to Klor's; and 2) the
profits it will lose when BH itself raises its price to monopoly
levels, thus reducing its sales volume.10 3 That the market is
highly concentrated at both the supply and retail level does not
101. id102. Krattenmaker and Salop consider whether the excluded rival will be
able to outbid the strategizing firm for the exclusionary right. I- at 273. They
give less thought to whether the strategizer's reservation price for the exclusionary right will be profitable to the supplier of the right. They conclude
without proof that "[firequently, suppliers will have alternative outlets for
their goods at little loss in revenue," if they reduce their market by selling an
exclusionary right. Id. "Thus, little additional compensation would be needed
to cover the suppliers' revenue shortfall." Id&; see also id. at 273 n.199 (giving
an example). An alternative hypothesis-that good retailers of appliances are
hard to find-seems equally plausible.
The same criticism applies to Krattenmaker's and Salop's illustration of
Alcoa's contracts with electric utilities not to sell to Alcoa's competitors. See
id at 227. One can hardly conclude that the utility can costlessly give up a
substantial customer. Power companies do not have the unlimited ability to
expand into new geographic areas, particularly if those areas are already controlled by others. Moreover, if overall capacity in the industry is sufficient or
excess, it is not at all clear that a lost customer can easily be replaced.
103. Actually, the analysis is more complicated. If the agreement between
BH and A were "naked"-that is, if BH were not buying appliances from A
anyway, A would simply lose all of its sales to Klor's. In the much more likely
situation where A was selling to BH and BH and Klor's were competitors, the
effect of the agreement would be to either force Klor's out of business or else
to switch to a different supplier of appliances. In either case, many customers
who would otherwise go to Klor's to purchase A's appliances would now go to
BH. Thus BH's sales might actually rise. Importantly, however, if BH raises
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ensure that this strategy will be profitable to BH. For example,
if A forgoes profits of $20 per unit on its sales to Klor's and if
BH is four times as big as Klor's (that is, sold four times as
many units before the exclusionary rights contract took effect)
it would cost BH $5 per unit of its own sales to raise Klor's
costs by $5 per unit. In that case both firms would experience
the same cost increase and one would normally expect that
10 4
neither firm would find that profitable.
Although Krattenmaker and Salop acknowledge that such
problems may prevent the exclusionary rights contract from
being negotiated, they do not incorporate discounting for such
likelihood into their objective test, which considers only the
structure of the market. The result, once again, is that a market that appears to be "conducive" to cost-raising strategies on
the basis of concentration information alone, is in fact not necessarily conducive to them. In that case, condemnation of a
vertical restraint capable of substantial efficiencies is manifestly contrary to the consumer welfare principle.
Consider this in a context in which it is likely to arise in
litigation. Unless BH is quite ill advised it will not leave behind
a distinct contract under which it purchases from A a naked
promise not to deal with Klor's. Rather, the agreement will be
disguised from authorities, perhaps as an exclusive dealing contract or arrangement in which A designates BH as its "exclusive" distributor in a certain city or area, effectively preventing
itself from selling to Klor's. Klor's alleges that the arrangement is in fact BH's purchase of an anticompetitive exclusionary right from A. 10 5 I suggest that no matter how concentrated
the appliance manufacturing market and the appliance retailing market, the court will not be able to conclude that this arrangement is anticompetitive in the way that Krattenmaker
and Salop suggest. Most importantly, it does not follow from
the market structure that A would be willing to accept any offer that BH would be willing to make for the purchase of this
monopoly.
its prices total sales of A's appliances would be less than they were previously
when both BH and Klor's sold them.
104. That is, each firm would experience a loss of volume but no increase
in profits per units sold.
105. Although A would ordinarily be willing to sell appliances to BH for,
say, $100, the parties have negotiated a contract calling for a sale price of $100
+ X, where X equals the price of the exclusionary right that BH is purchasing. X could also be the provision of sales services that BH would not otherwise provide to A.
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Add an additional factor into the calculus: BH alleges that
Kor's was engaged in persistent free riding of point-of-sale
services offered by BH. As a result, BH argues, it was in A's
best interest that Klor's be terminated, and total market output
will actually rise as a result.
Now the court faces a problem of a different order of magnitude than that described by Krattenmaker and Salop. First,
using their test, the court would inquire whether the market
structure is such that an exclusionary rights strategy is plausible. If the answer is no, the exclusive dealership agreement is
legal. If the answer is yes, the court must next consider
whether the arrangement in this case is efficient or else is a device for raising Klor's costs disproportionately to BH's so that
BH can charge monopoly prices. To answer this question the
court must look beyond the structure of the market. The court
must also determine: 1) the amount of profits A would forego
by not selling to Klor's; 2) the amount of profits A would forego
when BH subsequently raises its own prices; and 3) the amount
of profits that BH could be expected to earn from this strategy.
If (3) is greater than the sums of (1) and (2), it is plausible that
BH has purchased an anticompetitive exclusionary rights contract from A. The court must still determine, however,
whether the exclusive dealership arrangement is efficient because Klor's has been engaged in free riding and A anticipates
that it will sell more appliances, not fewer, under the new arrangement 0 6 It will be some time before courts or even
strategizing firms will be able to manage all these calculations
07
in real world markets.1
106. For a summary of the traditional economic analysis of free riding and
its impact on supplier output, see H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, § 9.2. Under
that analysis, a vertical restriction that eliminates free riding will increase the
supplier's sales, at least in the long run. Id One prominent scholar, it should
be noted, has argued that the fact that a vertical arrangement increases output
is not dispositive of its efficiency. Scherer, supra note 27, at 697-704. In that
event even a measurement of the restriction's effect on output would not determine whether it is efficient. d
107. In their analysis of efficiency and how it should be accounted for,
Krattenmaker and Salop observe that one consequence of efficiency is reduced
costs for the purchaser of the exclusionary right; as a result, he is willing to
pay more for the exclusionary right. This may be true, but it does little to
help distinguish between a vertical arrangement that is on balance anticompetitive and one that is competitive.
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CONCLUSION: ALTERNATIVE, ADMINISTRABLE
SOLUTIONS
The preceding comments do not reflect substantial doubts
on my part that vertical restrictions can be used to raise rivals'
costs. I believe that firms do employ cost-increasing strategies
anticompetitively and that vertical restrictions may be one such
strategy. 0 8 The problem is to devise a set of rules that increases social welfare enough to be worth the costs of antitrust
enforcement. At this stage, the tests Krattenmaker and Salop
propose do not seem to be well designed to do that.
On the other hand, there may be alternative routes to the
same destination, or at least one that is relatively close. This
essay does not propose a comprehensive set of enforcement
rules, as Krattenmaker and Salop have done, but rather makes
a few suggestions, some drawn from Krattenmaker's and
Salop's own analysis.
First, no policy is served by considering either strategy or
structure in cases involving truly "naked" restraints. The
purchase from a vertically related firm of nothing but a promise not to deal with a rival is classic material for the per se rule.
Granted, the anticompetitive consequences of such a purchase
may be open to doubt, 10 9 but it is equally clear that such a
purchase produces no cost savings for anyone and thus must be
anticompetitive in its motive if not its effect. If a practice obviously has no efficiency value whatsoever, then any reasonable
possibility for harm makes condemnation appropriate as soon
as the tribunal is able to place the restraint in this category." 0
Provisionally at least, other activities that Krattenmaker
and Salop describe should also be placed in this per se classification. For example, as far as I know no one has ever provided
a rational efficiency explanation for contracts in which a supplier promises to charge higher prices to the contracting firm's
competitors than it charges to the contracting firm."' Once
108. On the other hand, I am far more confident that competitors acting in
concert use such strategies. See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 276-78.
109. For example, it is difficult to see how such a purchase would permit
supracompetitive pricing if both vertically related markets are competitive.
110. That is, costs of determining the competitive consequences of the restraint must also be considered. See K. ELZINGA & W. BRErr, THE ANTITRUST
PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 9-12 (1976); H. HOVENKAMP,

supra note 15, §§ 10.1-.4; Schwartz, An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust
Enforcement 68 GEO. L.J. 1075 (1980).
111. Krattenmaker and Salop deal with this under their "cartel ringmaster" theory. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 1, at 238-40.
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again, if efficiency claims are so weak that not even a theoretical case for efficiency can be made, per se condemnation is appropriate if there is any reasonable possibility of competitive
harm.
Additionally, any rule of reason evaluation of a vertical restraint should assesss the impact of the restraint on rivals'
costs, particularly if there is empirical evidence of actual cost
increases to rivals flowing from the restraint. If the evidence is
good enough that the court can estimate these cost increases,
closer scrutiny of any claimed efficiencies is then in order. The
burden should then be shifted to the defendant to provide evidence of the magnitude of claimed efficiencies. Likewise, there
may be direct evidence that a vertical restraint facilitates a particular antitrust violation such as collusion."1 In that case,
however, the proper course for the court would be to condemn
the facilitated violation.
Finally, Krattenmaker and Salop are correct to conclude
that judicial supervision of vertical arrangements is more appropriate if the cost-saving effects and the exclusionary effects
can be disaggregated, even if they cannot be measured. Under
the "less restrictive alternative" analysis appropriately applied
in rule-of-reason cases' 1 3 a court might be quite willing to concede that an arrangement creates efficiencies, but nevertheless
require that the arrangement be restructured in such a way as
to preserve the efficiencies while eliminating or reducing the
potential for harm to competition. Several Supreme Court
4
cases involving horizontal agreements fall into this category,"1
and there is no theoretical reason why the same rule should not
apply to vertical arrangements.

112. The "Frankenstein monster" theory, supra text accompanying notes
63-69, is the theory under which this is most likely to occur.
113. See 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 8, %1505 (1986).
114. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. v. Board of Regents, 468
U.S. 85 (1984); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 13 n.10, 21 (1945);
United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). In each of these
cases, the Court recognized efficiencies in joint ventures of competitors, but
condemned various restrictions on entry or output. See H. HOvENKAMP, supra
note 15, § 10.3.

